switch-linux/security/integrity/digsig.c
David Howells a511e1af8b KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.

What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.

Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.

With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.

Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.

To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained.  For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.


If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject().  The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11 22:43:43 +01:00

160 lines
3.7 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation
*
* Author:
* Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/digsig.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include "integrity.h"
static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
#ifndef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
"_evm",
"_ima",
#else
".evm",
".ima",
#endif
"_module",
};
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
static bool init_keyring __initdata = true;
#else
static bool init_keyring __initdata;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
/*
* Restrict the addition of keys into the IMA keyring.
*
* Any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in
* either .system or .ima_mok keyrings.
*/
static int restrict_link_by_ima_mok(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
unsigned long flags,
const union key_payload *payload)
{
int ret;
ret = restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(keyring, type, flags, payload);
if (ret != -ENOKEY)
return ret;
return restrict_link_by_signature(get_ima_mok_keyring(),
type, payload);
}
#else
/*
* If there's no system trusted keyring, then keys cannot be loaded into
* .ima_mok and added keys cannot be marked trusted.
*/
#define restrict_link_by_ima_mok restrict_link_reject
#endif
int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
const char *digest, int digestlen)
{
if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (!keyring[id]) {
keyring[id] =
request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err);
keyring[id] = NULL;
return err;
}
}
switch (sig[1]) {
case 1:
/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig + 1, siglen - 1,
digest, digestlen);
case 2:
return asymmetric_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen,
digest, digestlen);
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int err = 0;
if (!init_keyring)
return 0;
keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
KGIDT_INIT(0), cred,
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
restrict_link_by_ima_mok, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n",
keyring_name[id], err);
keyring[id] = NULL;
}
return err;
}
int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
{
key_ref_t key;
char *data;
int rc;
if (!keyring[id])
return -EINVAL;
rc = integrity_read_file(path, &data);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1),
"asymmetric",
NULL,
data,
rc,
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(key);
pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate (%d): %s\n",
rc, path);
} else {
pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s': %s\n",
key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description, path);
key_ref_put(key);
}
kfree(data);
return 0;
}